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Abstract 
Folkpsychological knowledge is ver): ignorant of infernal facts of the body. 
Folkpsychology is really ver): sztperficial and very behaviouristic. On the other hand, what 
happens inside our bodies must be ver): imporrant and relevantfor a scientific psychology. 
According to Fodor, otzly mental properties identified by rneans of cnusal powers that locally 
supewene on the body (narrow contents) are the business ofa  scientificpsychology. In thispaper, 
and through rhe notion of «canonical contexts of attribution», 1 explore apossible strategyfor 
having also rhe local supervenience of some folk-contents (broad conterzts) and to develop causal 
theories about thern. 
Resumen 
La atribución de actitztdesproposicionales se realiza con un completo desconocimiento 
de cuáles puedan ser los hechos internos que ocurran en nuestros cuerpos. Pero son justamente 
estos hechos los que deben importar en unapsicología cient$ca. Según Fodor, lapsicologia debe 
individualizar propiedades mentales sólo en relación a propiedades causales que puedan 
sobrevenir localmente sobre los cuerpos de los sujetos. En este trabajo y a través de la noción 
de «contextos canónicos de atribución», se examina una posible estrategia para conseguir que 
las actitudes proposicionales atribuídas puedan también ser localmente sobrevenientes y tener 
cierto tipo de eficacia causal. 
1. Two points of view: folkpsychology and knowledge of the body 
Folkpsychology is the ordinary knowledge we can have of the mental life of 
whateverpsychologica1 subject. Now, what is apsychological subject?. Perhaps the best 
answer would be that a psychological subject is whatever entity that could be known and 
which behaviour could be predicted and explained by means of folkpsychology. And 
such a charactenzation would not be circular or defective because psychological subjects 
can exist even though we may not have knowledge of their existence. The possibility not 
the actuality of folkpsychological knowledge is the key characteristic that permits the 
reality of a psychological subject. This is the reason why sometimes the real existence of 
a psychological subject - o u r  real existence as psychological subjects for inctance- 
appears to be only a business of counterfactual considerations. People -some animals and 
perhaps come artifacts too- think, desire, hope, hate and so on, and they act according to the 
things they think, desire, hope, hate and so on. Folkpsychology is the intuitive and 
mentalistic psychology of common sense. Its basic rules are well known for almost al1 
people. For example, if someone believes that if A then B, and desires B, then -»ceteris 
paribus»- helshe will try to make A become true. Folkpsychology appeals to a mental life 
full of beliefs, desires and so forth. Folkpsychology is quite universal, it starts very early 
in our lives and, for the moment, it has no relevant rivals. Yet, in spite of such pervasiveness, 
folkpsychological knowledge is very ignorant of the body. We usually describe the mental 
life of people -roughly, that they think and desire and what they think and desire- with 
expressions that ignore any consideration to what is happening inside their bodies. 
Let's refer to the context as al1 those facts from which we obtain andjustify the 
folkpsychological descriptions of the mental life of a subject according to a content. In 
general, the context of a thing X will be made up of al1 the facts of the world -past, 
present future- but will actually exclude facts -past, present or future- inside X. 
Usually we don't need go inside the skin of anyone to know a lot about hisher 
folkpsychology. People, you yourself, could be made of silicon and cheese, for instance, 
and people could have the oddest intemal structures you can imagine, but from the point 
of view of folkpsychology nothing of this would matter. The things that matter are in 
the context. Here, the skin of the body, in a metaphorical sense that includes movements 
of the body and other such things, belongs to the context as one of its limits. The context 
starts, so to speak, with the skin andincludes or can include al1 the rest of the world. From 
the folk perspective al1 we need -in order to obtain and justify folkpsychological 
descsiptions of the mental life of a psychological subject- is a context. Folkpsychology 
is really very superficial and very behaviouristic. 
On the other hand, from a scientific viewpoint what happens inside our body is 
very important and relevant and requires consideration if we want to explain and make 
scientifically clear our psychology. Biology and medical sciences stress the idea that al1 we 
are is unavoidably related to our bodies. From such a perspective, facts about the structure 
and composition of our bodies are crucial for scientifically knowing our psychology. 
Let's refer to internal facts as al1 those facts that belong to our internal 
functional structure orto our intemal stuff. In general, the internal facts of a thing X will 
be made up of al1 the facts -past, present or future- inside X. 
The points of view of folkpsychology and of the knowledge of the body are 
opposite in at least four respects: 1) in respect to criteria of identification of mental 
properties. 2) in respect to ways in which mental properties can supervene on another 
non-mental properties. 3) in respect to how mental causation can be possible, and, 4) in 
respect to ways of elaborating sound psychological theories. 
1 )  Identificatioiz of mental properties 
Folkpsychological cnteria of identification of the mental have two important 
characteristics: 1) they are fuzzy and prototypical, that is, they don't offer necessary nor 
sufficient conditions for the identification of something having a mental property, and, 
2) mental properties are individuated, as we have noted, without any concern to internal 
facts. Let's analize more the second characteristic.' A lot of work about how we attribute 
mental properties according to a semantical content suggests that, here, mental proper- 
ties count as only attributed properties in the following sense. A property will be an only 
attributed propei-ty to a thing X -an OA property- iff the assertion that X has that 
property is completely justified by the knowledge of come peculiar facts of the context 
of X. If mental properties are OA properties, the only relevant facts in the world in order 
to rnake folkpsychological assertions about a subject X will also be facts that belong to 
the context of X. And the only source of justification for the attributions of these OA 
properties will be also the context. On the other hand. if thejustification of the attribution 
of a property requires the knowledge of come internal facts, the property will be a not- 
only attributed one. So, a property will be a izot-only attributodproper~ to ¿I thing X- 
an NOA property- iff the assertion that X has that property is justified only by the 
knowledge of come inteinal facts of X. The source of justification for the attribution of 
NOA properties to a thing is come kind of knowledge of its internal facts. 
Let's suppose, for example, the property P. «Px» is true iff Px. So far. so good. 
Now, if the knowledge of some facts of the context of x is enough to justify the assertion 
Px, P will be an OA property. If, on the other hand, it is necessary to know come internal 
facts of x in order to justify the assertion Px, P will be a NOA property. «To be number 
one in a racen. «to have a lot of homeworkn, «to look happy» and so on, could be 
examples of OA properties. Properties like «to be green» or «to have a certain shape» 
are also OA properties that refer to the particular appearence, to the «skin», of the 
objects. We are justified in their attribution if we know a lot of facts about how we are 
looking at the objects, facts about our eyes, the light? the perspecrive and so on. And we 
don't need to know anything about the internal facts of those things with those OA 
properties. By contrast, «To be water», «to be a lion», «to be made of cheesen, «to have 
five components~. etc, are examples of NOA properties. In order to attribute these 
properties with enough justification, we need the knowledge of some internal facts of 
the things that have them. This is the point of view of the knowledge of the body with 
respect to mental properties. Its criteria of identification of the mental intend to offer, 
in the ideal case, necessary and sufficient conditions. They intend also to individuate 
' Let's remember. for instante. the aorks of Burge, Davidson. dennett. Putnam and Stich about this topic. 
mental properties according to internal facts of the bodies. Hence, mental properties 
must count as NOA properties with characteristic causal powers associated mainly via 
our nervous systems. These NOA properties could have, not only an intrinsic character, 
but also a relational one. If this is so, then there would have to exist some causal laws 
reflecting this relational character. Here, the distintion between relational and intrinsic 
-not relational- properties is, in a logical and metaphysical sense, irrelevant. It has 
only an heuristic and pragmatic interest. The important thing is the notion of NOA 
properties associated with genuine causal powers. These causal powers must capable of - 
being represented with certain, monadic or poliadic, predicates in a way that can support 
genuine and lawful causal connections. These causal connections are considered the 
only useful and definitive criteria of identification of the mental. 
2 )  Supewenience 
What about supervenience?. Roughly, let's say that a set of properties 
supervenes on another set of properties if any distinction that can be put with regard to 
the having of the former properties entails some difference with regard to the having of 
the latter ones, the properties of the so called basis of the supervenience relation. If the 
properties of this basis are internal properties of a thing, we'll say that the supervenience 
is local. Now, if mental properties are OA properties, as they are from the 
folkpsychological viewpoint, it seems unlikely that they can locally supervene on the 
internal facts of the subjects. If, on the other hand, mental properties are NOAproperties, 
their local supervenience on more basic properties of the subjects appears much more 
likely. 
3) Mental causation 
Mental causation must be covered by causal laws. This is the only -not 
metaphorical- sense in which we can understand mental causation as apart of the order 
of the world. But, how could an OA property be the antecedent or consecuent part of the 
description of a genuine causal law?. Local supervenience and mental causation seem 
to need NOA properties. Folkpsychology poses a very hard problem here. Really, we 
don't know how to identify mental properties without the folk criteria of identification. 
If we leave the knowledge of the body alone, we don't have any psychological 
knowledge at all. But, mental properties only are capable of local supervenience and 
they only can have causal efficiency through the internal facts of the subject that has 
them. It cannot be otherwise unless to have mental properties is a mere truism or a shorter 
way of speaking of another thing, of another thing that belongs to the context. 
4 )  Psychological theories 
Finally, in order to elaborate psychological theories, the adoption of the 
folkpsychological perspective seems to entail our looking for them inside sociolinguistic 
theones of attribution os somethinhg like that. It is supposed that the psychological 
properties described by these theories can't locally supervene on internal properties of 
the psychological subjects. They supervene on other properties of the world. And, 
perhaps, mental causation could be constructed with these bricks. But, the important 
point is that al1 this leads to a very odd project. To adopt this sort of perspective means 
to give up a lot of plausible intuitions about the supervenience of the mental, about 
mental causation and about what must be relevant for a scientific psychological theory 
in which the body of the psychological subject plays a central role. 
At a first look and through these four areas, the opposition between the point 
of view of folkpsychology and the point of view of the knowledge of the body is clear. 
Of course, you can say that this is not at al1 true. As far as folkpsychology accepts some 
general constrictions about what sort of bodies can have mental life, it is not so 
indifferent to internal facts of the body. Nowadays, this might be the case for our 
folkpsychology. If the old folkpsychology was linked to magic and religion in respect 
to the internal facts of our bodies, our folkpsychology is linked to science in a lot of folk 
ways. But, folkpsychology can work very well without these commitments. Moreover, 
it must do it in most of its working situations. This is an important point that we must 
not forget. We want to establish come links between the point of view of folkpsychology 
and the point of view of the knowledge of the body. But, the links set up by means of 
constrictions on the folk attributions are only contingent and accidental. They exist, but 
they are an irrelevant part of the folk. The scientifically important links between 
folkpsychology and the knowledge of the body must be found in another place. 
2. Fodor: methodological individualism and the narrowhroad divide 
Which is Fodor's view about these problems?. According to Fodor,' indi- 
vidualism is a general methodological position in science. Having a property is 
something individuated with respect to its causal powers. Only properties individuated 
this way count as scientifically relevant properties. Most of scientific taxonomies 
respect individualism. Psychology is individualistic too. Psychological states must be 
individuated with respect to their causal powers. Identity of psychological states must 
entail identity of causal consequences across contexts. Individualism doesn't prohibit 
the fact that some properties can be relational. But, if they are, then there must be some 
causal laws reflecting this. 
Tvviiz's stories -and related cases- try to show that some psychological 
properties are relative to the context and that they can't locally supervene on the actual 
body of the subject. Fodor considers this unproblematic. Twin's stories only show that 
the semantical evaluation is relative to a context. This relativity doesn't support lawful 
generalizations across contexts. Therefore, semantical evaluation of mental states is 
relative to each context, but it has no psychological relevance for elaboratingrespectable 
psychological theories. 
Semantical properties are like the property of being an H-(T-jparticle. Let's 
say, with Fodor, that whatever particle in the universe is an H-(T-)particle at time t iff 
at t my dime is heads-up. And that whatever particle in the universe is at time t a T- 
Mainly, FODOR (1980 and 1987). 
particle iff at t my dime is tails-up. Whether something is an H or an T particle is 
completely irrelevant to its causal powers. Similarly for the property of being a mental 
state of a person who lives in a world where there is XYZ rather than H 2 0  in the Twin 
cases. 
Local supervenience of the mental on the nervous system of the subject must 
be preserved. So if we don't have mechanisms that link our semantical evaluations of 
the mental with the causal powers of the nervous systems of the subjects, semantical 
evaluations cannot count as relevant indicators of psychological properties. 
Methodological individualism, local supervenience of mental properties on 
neural properties -perhaps functional ones- and the lack of such a mechanism lead 
to rnethodological solipsism: the doctrine that psychological properties must be indi- 
viduated without respect to their semantical evaluation. 
Psychological states so individuated have narrow contents. Narrow contents 
are complex functions from thoughts and contexts to semantical properties. These kinds 
of functions are instantiated in our nervous systems. The particular values of these 
functions in each context constitute the broad corztents of our folkpsychological speech 
in relation to that context. How could we pick out narsow contents?. Well, Fodor's 
answer involves procedures of mention and counterfactual use of ourbroad contents, but 
narrow contents are strictly unexpressable. Their direct expression would requise not 
only a mention but also a use of our broad contents, and broad contents aren't the 
contents a scientific psychology demands. 
1 have always had serious doubts about this notion of narsow content. One of 
my main problems might be put roughly as follows. Narrow contents are, we have said, 
complex functions between thoughs, contexts and semantical values. In some way, 
these functions are instantiated in our bodies. The orzly guide we have with which to posit 
and differenciate narrow contents is this: in whatever context, narrow contents related 
with a thought must yield the semantical values we would adscribe to that thought in that 
context. But, this is not very much. A lot of different furzctional and causal networks 
instantiated in our aewous systems co~ild do the work. We have at hand a lot of these 
plausible functional and causal networks for each thought instantiated in our body. If we 
think about other sorts of bodies, the problem becomes much more pei-plexing: too many 
networks and too many kinds of networks. They may differ only in very small details, 
but how to discriminate the importance or not of these details? How to select the 
adequate, functiona13 and causal, networks? How to cut into the adequate portions the 
functional and causal cake (in portions that we can scientifically eat)?. The problem is 
that if you come back to your «only guide», and you claim that al1 these networks and 
kinds of networks constitute an unique narsow content, then to be this specific narrow 
content irzstead of some other becornes a property only identified by rnearzs of the 
identification of OA properties. But, we must, 1 am sure, make the body matter more. 
Here, you can remember the arguments Putnam (1988) uses about the logical proliferation of functional 
explanations. Unless we adopta perspective similar to the one 1 will sketch. folk-identified mental properties 
will be properties so open with respect tot their functional specifiation as functional properties are with respect 
to their physical and causal implementation. 
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3) Change of perspective: canonical contexts of attribution and only-attibuted but 
locally supervenient and causally efficacious properties 
Now, 1 want to explore a possible way out of this problem. What we have 
always desired to have is the local supervenience of the mental properties identified 
according to our folk criteria and to develop causal theories about these mental 
properties. This is, 1 believe, a warranted wish. 
Al1 the so-called secondaiy properties of things (colours, sounds, etc.) share 
with our folk-identified mental properties the following characteristics: 1) they are OA 
properties in the cense defined. 2) their supervenience is generally supposed non local, 
and, 3) they don't belong to our deep microphysical theories of the world. But, this is 
not al1 the story. Although the first characteristic remains unchanged, we have controlled 
sitciatioizs in which secondary properties are locally supervenient and belong to our, not- 
so-deep, theories of the world. Very often we consider colours as locally supervenient 
properties and, in this way, we use colour terms in our biological and chemical theories. 
Whether colours are or not metaphysically dispensable: in a deep scientific image of the 
world, is a very interesting philosophical problem. But, the fact is they are not 
dispensable in the ordinary scientific practice. This seems crucial to psychological 
theory. A psychological theory about the mental is not a philosophical one. 
According to Fodor. we must distinguish strictly between narrow and broad 
mental contents and to baselconstrue scientific theories only onlabout the first ones. But 
it is like saying.physica1 objects must have come colours, narrow colours; that in no way 
are the colours, the broad colours, we see and describe from our context and that those 
narrow colours are the topic of a scientific theory of colour. If we don't consider in any 
way the colours with which we see the objects, objects couldn't have any colour at all. 
They could have physical. chemical properties and so forth, but not colours. To speak 
about mental contents is like speakiizg abour colours. There must be some canonical 
corztext of attribution: some appropriate circumstances, in which the broad can be 
locally supervenient and can have lawful causal efficiency. To find out these particular 
circumstances for the mental is not only a conceptual problem but also, and mainly, an 
empirical one. A problem of the same variety is the problem of finding out the 
circumstances in which some peculiar interna1 structures are responsible for the 
emission of the light waves we associate with determinate colours. 
Now, let's cal1 a property irztrinsical if it is representable with a certain 
monadic predicate capable of suporting genuine and lawful causal connections. A 
property will be relational if it is representable by a non monadic predicate capable of 
being incorporated in genuine and lawful causal connections. It is clear that properties 
can exist that are neither intrinsic nor relational. Some OA properties are of this kind, 
for instance, Fodor's property of being an H-(T-)particle. Often it is supposed that 1) OA 
properies can only be, if they are something, relational properties with a non-local 
supervenience, and that 2) only NOA properties can be intrinsical and locally superve- 
nient. But, 1 consider both suppositions erroneous. First, as we have already mentioned, 
usually the distinction between intrinsical and relational properties depends, only, on 
heuristic and pragmatic decisions. That distinction is relative to our interests and very 
often it doesn't entail any relevant logical or metaphysical difference. Second and more 
important, the way in which we have characterized our concepts, there isn't any reason 
why an OA property cannot be, in some cases, intrinsic and locally supervenient. 
Colours are a paradigmatic example of properties of this kind. 
The statement that something has a determinate colour is completely justified 
by the knowledge of some facts of its context. But, in some special conditions of the 
context of attribution, the colours of an object are really intrinsic and locally superve- 
nient properties, part and parcel of the object's microphysical structure and composi- 
tion. In normal conditions of vision, colours are intrinsic and locally supervenient but 
also OA properties. If the conditions of vision are less than normal, if we have on our 
«sunglasses», for instance, colours are no longer either intrinsic or locally supervenient 
properties. To determine, precisely, normal conditions of vision is, as we have said, a 
difficult empirical problem; and the hypothesis that normal conditions exist involves 
numerous commitments. There is nothing trivial about them, and the same questions 
must be confronted in relation to mental contents. 
If we have our «sunglasses>> on, we lose the intrinsic and locally supervenient 
character of our colours, of the colours seen. But, this loss does not alter the intrinsic and 
locally supervenient character of OA properties. It only entails the relativity of this 
character to some fixed canonical context of attribution. In al1 empirical sciences the 
notion of normal conditions, those defining a canonical context of attribution, has a very 
clear function. And why not in psychology as well? Why must mental contents, broad 
mental contents, be more like H-(T-) particles than like colours?. To be in normal 
conditions is an extremely complex predicate and one that surely doesn't refer merely 
to OA properties, but it does, indeed, imply the intnnsic and locally supervenient 
character of some OA properties. 
4. Only one kind of content 
Fodofi says: 
«Your thought is content-identical to mine only if in every context in which 
you thought has truth condition T, mine has truth condition T and vice versa» 
This is, contents instantiate the same functions from contexts to truth condi- 
tions. These are the mental contents relevant to our scientific theories of the mental. 
They are the narrow contents. On the other hand? 
«The 'broad' content of a thought is what you can semantically evaluate; it's 
what you get when you specify a narrow content and fix a context» 
In the perspective I am sketching, there are not two sorts of mental contents. 
As we have seen, if there are two -broad and narrow contents as they are defined by 
Fodor-, and we try to specify the peculiar way narrow contents are instantiated in our 
body, then there would be too rnanyfunctional and causal candidates. And the class to 
V O D O R  (1987: Chap. 2 ) .  
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which they al1 belong can only be characterized by means of OA properties; that is by 
means of contextualized semantical properties like having -the thoughts in question- 
such and such truth conditions in such and such contexts. Really, the body must matter 
more. There must, thus, be only one sort of mental content. One sort of mental content 
with a condition of identity similar to this: 
Your thought is content-identical to mine if 1)in every context in which your 
thought has truth condition T, mine has truth condition T and vice versa, and 
2) your internal structure and composition when you have your thought is 
sufficiently similar to mine when 1 have my thought in a canonical context 
of (self-)attribution 
Let's explain. Subcondition 2 would reduce the proliferation of structural and 
compositional internal facts capable of fulfilling subcondition 1. The identity of 
contents is defined over the folkpsychological contents even though, in principle, they 
were ignorant of internal facts of the subjects. They are OA properties. If it is possible, 
a psychological theory related with the knowledge of the body must look for the local 
supervenience of these properties and for their causal relationships. To do this, the idea 
of canonical contexts of attribution is rich and suggestive. It is the standard, most 
travelled road in al1 of science. Science by nature covers OA properties with NOA ones 
through the fixing of canonical contexts of attribution. 1 am afraid that if we don't try 
something similar, we will find ourselves relegated to the field ofperipherical cognitive 
sciences: that is, sociolinguistics, artificial intelligence, neurophysiology, reflexive 
folkpsychology and so on, far from a scientific cognitive psychology. But, 1 am also 
convinced that, in fact, something like this actually occurs in the everyday efforts of 
most psychologists. 
In Fodor's view, narrow contents are complex functions from thoughts and 
contexts to the semantical properties, truth conditions, for instance, that would constitute 
the broad contents of these thoughts in these contexts. Those functions are instantiated in 
our bodies, mainly in our nervous systems. What makes a thought have the semantical 
values it has -according to folk attributions in whatever context-, is something 
instantiated in the body. But, if folkpsychology is as ignorant of intemal facts of the bodies 
as we have claimed, no NOA property of the body can do this work. Your classical Twins 
and you share the same narrow contents since your thoughts in the same contexts must 
besemantically evaluated in the same way. But, this is not really a very difficult case: the 
same contexts plus the same intemal facts must originate the same worlds. And broad 
contents, 1 am sure, supervene on the world. Now, imagine anothercase of Twins. You have 
aTwin who inno way shares with you any intemalfact-structural neithercompositional- 
but whose thoughts have, in every possible context, the same semantical values, the same 
truth conditions for instance, that your thoughts have. How could this be possible?. Well, 
your Twin is a very superficial Twin: helshe merely behaves like you, helshe merely reacts 
like you and so on. According to Fodor, your thoughts and the superficial Twin's thoughts 
share the same narrow mental contents because the thoughts of both have the same 
semantical evaluations in the same contexts. But, by hypothesis, you do not share any 
internal fact with your superficial Twin!. The only kind of properties that you share with 
hirnher are OA properties. Hence, narrow mental contents are OA properties too. Of 
course, extensionally, a narrow content is an equivalence class of internal facts. The 
class of al1 relevant internal facts of the subjects whose thoughts have in the same 
contexts the same semantical properties. But, again, belonging to this class of internal 
facts -functional and causal interna1 facts- is also an OA property. 
Fodor's strategy doesn't help to select interesting NOA properties that can be 
associated with the folk mental life; that is, with the OA properties that constitute the 
folk contents. Classical Twins or superficial Twins don't help either. The former are 
exactly like ourselves in al1 internal facts. And the latter are completely different. The 
right solution must be found between them, in some notion of similarity between us, or 
our clacsical Twins, and whatever possible superficial Twin. In other words, we don't 
know what Fodor's ineffable n m o w  contents are. We only have the broad contents of 
our folkpsychological attributions, the various -real or counterfactuals- contexts in 
which we -really or counterfactually- attribute them and come knowledge of the 
internal facts of the psychological subjects to which we attribute these contents. These 
constitute the pieces of the puzzle. And the main options -in order to select in the 
subjects NOA properties related to these contents- are: 
1) To consider that there will be no definite NOA properties of this kind 
unless -perhaps future- self-restrictions of the folk attributions of 
mental properties reduce this indefiniteness 
2) To choose a pnvileged class of contexts of attribution -the sort of 
contexts we have called «canonical»-, to describe the relevant interna1 
facts that covary with our attributions of mental contents and to construe? 
by means of similarity relationships, a class of internal facts on which the 
attributed mental contents can be locally supervenient on the body and 
can have the causal efficacy we want for mental properties as mental 
properties embodied in a subject. 
The first is not really an option. Folkpsychology is as predictive, successful and 
universal as it is because of the autonomy of its attributions: the supposed self- 
restrictions are either an irrelevant part of folkpsychology, as we have said already, or, 
if relevant, they only spell suicide. But, the second option needs much more refinement. 
5. Some refinements 
We need to make clear a lot of points. First of all, what are, more precisely, 
those canonical contexts of attributions and how might they be discovered?. Intuitively, 
canonical contexts of attribution for mental properties, like whatever canonical context, 
are contexts in which al1 goes well. We cannot discover in them anything that converts 
our attributions into errors. The mental properties attributed by folkpsychology are OA 
properties, but the attributions may be fallible. There are sound, correct attributions and 
unsound, incorrect attributions. Let's suppose, as 1 assumed earlier, that colours are OA 
properties too. This doesn't mean that the colours we see and describe when we have 
our «sunglasses» on and when we know this fact -fact that belongs to the context- 
are colours we are disposed to attribute to the objects. In relation to mental properties 
we are in a very similar situation. 
To be an H-(T-)particle is an OA property too. But, it is a property that doesn't 
have any causal relevance. We don't have any causal law in which these properties 
appear. On the other hand, to be of a certain colour orto have certain mental content are 
properties causally relevant in certain conditions: in those conditions that convert a 
determinate context of attribution of these properties into a canonical one. In these 
conditions, we can know what intemal facts are happening -incide the skin- and we 
can try relevant covariations between these internal facts and our attributions, retaining 
the canonical character of the contexts in which we make the attributions. We don't need 
any other metaphysical background about meaning, causality and the order of the world. 
We need only to apply to mental life the sume epistemological stl-ategy that we apply 
innatural science toproperties like colours, sounds, macroscopic objects and so on when 
we think they are interesting properties from the scientific point of view. 
Once again, in some cases colours are locally supervenient on classes of 
intemal facts of the things. Supervenience epistemologized is no more than an affair of 
lawless covariation. The only metaphysics we need is inside the limits of science, its 
epistemology and its methodology. So, colours, as colours, could have some sort of 
causal efficacy because of some sort of internal facts. Of course, a lot of attributions of 
colours are out of play: for instance, al1 the attributions we can make when we have on 
our «sunglasses» -and, it can be sunglasses of a very wide physical and philosophical 
variety-. Moreover, there are not two kinds of colours, narrow and broad colours. 
There is only one kind. Some special members of this kind are locally supervenient and 
have a causal efficacy according to our science. 
In reference to folk contents, we could say exactly the same. Not al1 folk 
contents but only some special ones must be locally supervenient on the body. Perhaps 
not in the precise format of cbeliefs-that» and «desires-that» but in the format of 
((beliefs-about» and «desires-ab~ut".~ These contents must be easily transportable with 
the bodies to other accesible and near-possible worlds. To other worlds in which we 
could be equipped with an epistemic and linguistic apparatus very close to the one we 
have in our actual world. Folkpsychology is very ignorant of the intemal facts of the 
psychological subjects, but it is equally ignorant of any internal facts of things within 
the context. So, the following counterfactual thesis must be true: 
IF 1) there would exist a world with intemal facts of the same type as those 
in our world-in relation to acanonical context of attribution of a certain mental 
content- that are the basis of a supervenient relation of this content, 
AND 2) in that world we were equipped with our same epistemic and 
linguistic powers, 
THEN 3) in such a world the subjects that have these internal facts will have 
that mental content too. 
In these conditions, we could have very different worlds but the same mental 
contents, the same folk, broadcontents. So, these contents could have alocal supervenience 
Or in the format of «core beliefs-about» and «core desires-aboutn. 1 don't think the core-strategy is a dead 
way for some --let's say <<simple minded»-- phychological subjects like non-human organims, children, vetry 
handicaped people or A1 engines. 
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and a causal efficiency. Of course, this would be applicable only to some folk contents. 
The other cases of folkcontents, contents to which al1 of this is inapplicable, must belong 
more to the field of sociolinguistic theory and practice than to the field of scientific 
psychology dealing with facts happening inside our body. 
A final and rather puzzling remark. Perhaps the sentence «the snow is white)) 
doesn't need to be true in every possible world in which the sentence «X believes that 
the snow is white» can adequately describe and refer to a true belief of X in that world. 
Perhaps the sentence «the snow is white» and the interna1 facts we could associate, from 
a canonical context of attribution and for subjects like you and me, with ((tabelieve that 
the snow is white» -the token of the mental sentence we have when we believe that the 
snow is white, if you prefer- don't belong to the same semantical type. Perhaps, they 
don't have the same truth conditions. Why suppose they do?. In order to refer and 
describe a thing with semantical properties, we don ' t  need to do it with arz expressior~ 
that has the sume semantical properties. We can, but we are not forced to do so. And, 
1 think that in relation to the basic andpre-folkpsychological semanticity of the mental, 
the things are so complicated to suspect that here this may be not the case it is best, as 
a strategy. When we identify mental contents -folk, broad contents- and we try to 
establish their local supervenience and their causal powers through a supposed canoni- 
cal context of attribution, we are in the same situation as we are when we interpreta text, 
a text in which the symbols -the tokens of these symbols- are causally connected 
among themselves and with some pieces of the world. This is, for instance, the situation 
we are in when we are interpreting an E-mail in our computer. We describe the message 
with expressions like «it says that ... », «if now it says that ..., 1 am sure that in the next 
page it will say that -», and so on. Let's say that this is the folkreading of the message. 
It is possible to identify unambiguously an expression of the computer with the 
description «it says that ... » even though that expression -the computer expression- 
doesn't have the same semantical properties that the expression «...» can have. Also, it 
is possible to look for the local supervenience in my computer of content c..» in spite 
of the fact that «to say that ... » is an OA property to my computer. Also, we can try to 
describe the causal relationships associated in my computer with content «...» as such 
a content. Furthermore, al1 of this could be made with mental contents and could serve 
as grounds for a scientific psychology in which folk contents are related with our 
knowledge of the body. But a problem remains. The expressions in my body -or in my 
computer- can have other basic and pre-folk semantical properties that the ones «...N 
in «I believe that ... » -or in «it says that ... »- can have. The problem is more 
complicated, because there is nothing in my body that is the trade-mark of a basic and 
original semanticity7. My mental word «cat» could be causally linked to cats in an 
' 1 rernember Dennett explonng recently this problern in a lecture given at the «iI Seminario intemniversitario 
de cienciacognitiva)) (Salamanca, March-1990. The title of his lecture was «TheInterpretationofTexts, People 
and other Artifacts)). Even if we are realists about mental properties, as D e m e n  seems to be now, we will have 
the very hard problern of finding out the natural --non artificial--. original and pre-fokpsychologica1 
rnechanirns that are the source on any mental property. But, perhaps, the divide between the natural and the 
artificial way. In the same artificial way, the word «cat» in my computer can be causally 
linked to cats, but with, as well, the same natural appearance with which our mental 
word «cat» is causally linked to cats according to FodoI-8. What is the difference between 
natural causal chains -natural causal chains that onginate the desiredbasic semanticity- 
and the artificial ones?. Perhaps, this difference is only relative to our conceptual 
schemes. Moreover, this difference cannot entail any difference in our bodies or in their 
nearcontexts. Of course, we can lookfor come basic, original andpre-folkpsychologica1 
semanticity although it depends on our conceptual schemes as a lot of very important 
things do! But, in this case, it must be clear that we will not be looking for another kirzd 
of conterzt but for the source of whatever content9. From the point of view of psycho- 
logical models guided by Fodor's representational theory of mind, al1 of this is ignored. 
But, 1 think that it could be an important starting point in order to coordinate such models 
with other new models, with connectionist models for instance. Perhaps scientific 
psychology needs to have more than one sort of models and the models for folk 
describable cognitive processes don 't need to be the models for the adquisition of basic 
andpre-jolkpsychological semanticity. This is a very important distinction, because it 
is quite possible to have theories about the former without any clear idea about how to 
describe and explain completely the latter, even with the help of new connectionist 
models. 
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artificial depends too much of the various, scientific and folk, humans conceptual schemes and polnts of view. 
«Cat» can becaused by cats also in alot of artificial ways. And the ways dogs couldcausein some circumstances 
«cat», for instance, also could be asymmetncally dependent on these artificial causal paths! --see FODOR 
(1990: Chap. 2 and 3)--. Now, our problem is not only the problem of distinguishing situations of type 1 from 
situations of type II, but also the problem if distinguishing the natural from the artificial. And, how to do it? 
For instance, FODOR (1990: Chap. 3 and 4). 
It is obvious that, for subjects like you and me, the «natural» learning of the public word «cat», for instance, 
must be an important part of the source of interna1 facts -mental tokens- that have the semantical content we 
descnbe by the word «cat». See last remarks of FIELD (1978). But, we must not be confused. One thing is 
the source of a mental content and other thing is the way we descnbe and identify this content. The basic 
semanticity that a source provides can be different from the semantical properties by means of which we are 
able to identify mental causal efficacy, inside of psychological theones sensible to interna1 facts of the body. 
